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Abstract: When immigrants experience “nationality discrimination” in the labor market, ceteris paribus their earnings are 
lower than native-born workers because they were born abroad.  The challenge to testing for nationality discrimination is 
that the native/immigrant earnings gap will very likely also be influenced by productivity differences driven by incomplete 
assimilation of immigrants, as well as the possibility of racial or gender discrimination. There is relatively little empirical 
literature, and virtually no theoretical literature,  on this type of discrimination.  In this study, a model of nationality 
discrimination where customer prejudice and native/immigrant productivity differences jointly influence the earnings gap is 
presented. We derive an extension of Becker’s Market Discrimination Coefficient (MDC), applied to the case of nationality 
discrimination when there are productivity differences. A number of novel implications are obtained. We find, for example, 
that the MDC depends upon relative immigrant productivity and relative immigrant labor supply. We test the model on data 
for hitters and pitchers in Major League Baseball, an industry with a history of immigration, potential for customer 
discrimination, and clean, detailed micro-data on worker productivities and race. OLS and decomposition methods are used 
to estimate the extent of discrimination. We find no compelling evidence of discrimination in the hitter group, but evidence 
of ceteris paribus underpayment of immigrant pitchers. While our test case is for a particular industry, our theoretical 
model, empirical specifications, and general research design, are quite generalizable to many other labor markets. 
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I. Introduction 
It is well established in the literature on immigrant earnings that immigrants, especially those who have 
been in the host country only for a short time, are paid differently than their native-born peers. In most 
countries, for example, immigrants have lower wage rates compared to natives. The literature provides 
two basic explanations for native/immigrant earnings differences. First, there could be productivity 
differences resulting from immigrants having: (a) lower “standard” qualifications -- years of schooling, 
years of experience, etc;  and/or (b) lower levels of host country human capital, i.e. lack of full 
assimilation.  Second, there could be discrimination against immigrants, what is often called 
“nationality discrimination.”1 If immigrants suffer nationality discrimination, they are ceteris paribus 
paid less than their native-born peers. One reason is prejudice against immigrants by host country 
residents. The challenge to estimating nationality discrimination is to separate the effects of 
productivity differences from the effects of nationality discrimination on the native-immigrant earnings 
gap.  As Nielsen, et al (2004) point out, “…when analyzing immigrant wage gaps in the presence of 
potential discrimination, it is important to disentangle the assimilation effect from a potential 
discrimination effect due to ethnicity…” (p. 859; our italics for emphasis).  
The literature has not yet resolved this “disentangling” problem for several reasons. First, the 
problem has not been analyzed theoretically. The literature on assimilation, beginning with Chiswick 
(1978) and Borjas (1985, 1987), has been very helpful in clarifying how incomplete assimilation 
accounts for productivity differences between natives and immigrants. However, this literature has 
generally not analyzed how assimilation influences the earnings gap when immigrants also experience 
nationality discrimination. We lack a theoretical understanding of how productivity differences and 
nationality discrimination jointly influence native/immigrant earnings differences.  Second, researchers 
                                                 
1 A third explanation is that there could be native/immigrant differences in labor supply. For example, immigrants may have 
lower wage elasticities of supply and/or lower reservation wages. The literature has generally not pursued this explanation, 
though. 
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have often chosen test cases where data constraints make the separation of an assimilation effect from a 
discrimination effect difficult. A common problem is that data on the quality of immigrant human 
capital is often difficult to obtain.  Another problem, emphasized by Bodvarsson and Fuess (2008), is 
that because many U.S. immigrants are non-white and because many studies do not control for race, 
available estimates of nationality discrimination could be biased because of missing controls for race. 
Consequently, we still know very little about the contribution of nationality discrimination to the 
native/immigrant wage gap. 
We contend that to properly address the “disentangling” problem pointed out by Nielsen et al 
(2004), two hurdles must be overcome. First, a theoretical model of production where natives and 
immigrants are distinct inputs and where immigrants experience discrimination must be articulated. 
This model would be in contrast to the standard model of discrimination where majority and minority 
workers are perfect substitutes. As the assimilation literature would strongly argue, a presumption of 
perfect substitution between natives and immigrants is highly inappropriate because of imperfect 
transferability of human capital across borders. Second, proper empirical verification of a nationality 
discrimination model requires a test case where there are (i) highly accurate and detailed micro-data on 
native and immigrant worker productivities; and (ii) one can adequately control for the potentially 
confounding effects of race (or gender).  
In this paper, we strive to overcome both these hurdles. We present a theory of tastes-based 
nationality discrimination using a model of production where natives and immigrants are imperfect 
substitutes. We derive a number of novel implications, which are then tested on a data set from an 
industry which is highly convenient for testing hypotheses about native/immigrant differences in pay – 
U.S. Major League Baseball. Major League Baseball is an industry with a long history of immigrant 
employment and where detailed and accurate data on player and firm performance are available. While 
this test case is selected because it is a convenient natural experiment for studying nationality 
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discrimination, we wish to emphasize that our model and test are generalizable to many other labor 
markets.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, we discuss the 
concept of nationality discrimination in more detail and then do an assessment of what the literature 
has to say about it. Our theoretical model is presented in section II. In Section III, we present evidence 
from tests of some of our model’s implications. Section IV offers concluding remarks. 
 
What is nationality discrimination and what does the literature on native/immigrant earnings 
differences have to say about it? 
There is a voluminous literature on racial and gender discrimination in the labor market, which dates 
back to the pioneering works of Gary Becker (1971) and Kenneth Arrow (1973).2 It is well known that 
labor market discrimination can take place with respect to other personal attributes such as age, 
religious affiliation, sexual orientation, weight, accent, or speech patterns. Another attribute that could 
induce discriminatory treatment is a worker’s nativity status. Nationality discrimination occurs when, 
ceteris paribus, immigrants are paid less because they were born outside of the host country.  This type 
of discrimination could be driven by prejudice (taste discrimination), imperfect information (statistical 
discrimination), or institutional factors.3 In this study, we will focus on nationality discrimination due 
to prejudice. 
There could be many reasons for prejudice against immigrants. Anecdotal information about 
nationality discrimination has been prevalent for many years. There are age-old jokes about U.S. 
immigrants from Ireland, Italy, and other countries regarding their mannerisms, attitudes, ways of life, 
etc. These sorts of jokes may be reflective of nationality discrimination. Native-born workers may 
harbor resentment towards immigrants because they perceive that immigrants take jobs from them. 
Native-born consumers may harbor biases against particular countries and value goods made by 
                                                 
2 For expository surveys of this literature, see Cain (1986) and Altonji and Blank (1999).  
3 For a thorough comparison and contrasting of different theories of labor market discrimination, see Cain (1986). 
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workers from those countries less.4 Prejudiced employers may have biases against hiring workers from 
particular countries. Nationality discrimination could occur in tandem with racial or gender 
discrimination.  For example, if non-white U.S. immigrants are paid differently from white persons 
born in the U.S., the differential treatment could reflect both racial discrimination and nationality 
discrimination. Furthermore, there could be an interaction between race and nativity status on pay; The 
marginal effect of nativity status on pay could depend upon the level of racial discrimination.5      
Compared to the literature on racial and gender discrimination, nationality discrimination has 
received very little attention. Two widely-cited expository surveys of the discrimination literature, Cain 
(1986) and Altonji and Blank (1999), make no mention of it.6  The Appendix to this paper lists 23 
studies on native-immigrant earnings differences that relate to nationality discrimination.  These studies 
have four characteristics. First, only half make the identification of nationality discrimination the focus 
of inquiry. Second, nearly all of these studies lack any original theoretical model. We found only two 
studies, Bucci and Tenorio (1997) and Hayfron (2002), which articulate a theoretical model of 
native/immigrant wage differentials based on taste discrimination.7 Those two models are very general 
and do not produce any novel implications that are carried over to an empirical specification. Third, 
most of the 23 studies listed in the Appendix do not address the potentially confounding effects of race 
or gender in the estimation of nationality discrimination. 
                                                 
4 For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, may have resulted in consumer discrimination against employers 
and their employees born in the Middle East. 
5 Nationality discrimination needs to be distinguished from “ethnic” discrimination. Ethnic discrimination is discrimination 
against persons of a particular ethnicity, or heritage, such as being Korean, Mexican, Italian, or having parents, 
grandparents, or ancestors from another country. One need not be foreign-born to experience ethnic discrimination. 
Nationality discrimination means that being native-born versus foreign-born makes a difference in how one is paid, all other 
things equal. 
6 Cain (1986) mentions “ethnic discrimination” only once (p. 1) and never mentions discrimination with respect to place of 
birth, whilst Altonji and Blank (1999) don’t mention either type of discrimination.  
7 We should also mention a theoretical study by Müller (2003), who uses a dynamic efficiency wage model to derive a 
ceteris paribus wage gap between natives and immigrants. Müller assumes that migrants differ from natives only because 
migrants have a positive probability of return migration. Firms anticipate that migrants will have a greater chance of 
shirking, hence they are paid less.  
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The first analysis of earnings differences between foreign- and native-born workers that 
indicates possible nationality discrimination is Chiswick’s (1978) pioneering study of U.S. immigrant 
assimilation.  One of Chiswick’s results, overshadowed by his evidence on immigrant assimilation, was 
a ceteris paribus earnings premium for immigrant males, as well as native/immigrant differences in 
rates of return to qualifications.8 While Chiswick did not say that nationality discrimination contributes 
to native/immigrant differences in earnings,9  he hinted at the possibility when he wrote (p. 908): 
“For the earnings of the foreign born to exceed the native born eventually suggests that 
the greater ability, work motivation, or investments in training of the foreign born more 
than offset whatever earnings disadvantages persist from discrimination against them or 
from their initially having less knowledge and skills relevant in U.S. labor markets” (our 
italics for emphasis). 
Tandon (1978) reported evidence of structural differences in earnings between native- and foreign-born 
male residents of Toronto, but made no mention of discrimination as a factor. Similar types of results 
were obtained by Fujii and Mak (1983), who studied differences in earnings between 6 different ethnic 
groups in Hawaii. Neither of these studies control for race, though.10 In a study of male U.K. 
immigrants, Chiswick (1980) found some evidence of a ceteris paribus earnings premium for 
immigrants. His results indicate that the size of the foreign/native earnings gap depends upon whether 
race is included as a control. Chiswick did not mention discrimination as a factor accounting for these 
results, though.  Meng (1987) estimated Chiswick’s model on Canadian data and found some evidence 
of a ceteris paribus earnings disadvantage for Canadian immigrants. However, like Chiswick, he did 
not draw any conclusions about whether this earnings gap indicated the presence of nationality 
discrimination. 
                                                 
8 For example, Chiswick found that the rate of return to education for an immigrant male was lower than for a native-born 
male. 
9 Chiswick said in a footnote (p. 899), that “The [native/immigrant] earnings gap would not close if a relevant knowledge 
deficiency persisted or if there were discrimination against the foreign born in wages, employment, union membership, or 
occupational licensing. On the other hand, in some jobs there may be discrimination in favor of the foreign born (e.g. the 
French chef)” (our italics for emphasis).  
10 It should be noted that while they lacked a race dummy in their empirical specifications, Fujii and Mak did distinguish 
Caucasians from members of  five different non-Caucasian groups. 
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The first study to focus on identifying nationality discrimination is Haig’s (1980) analysis of 
Australian panel data. While Haig’s study has substantial data limitations that put his estimates at high 
risk of omitted variables bias,11 his study has two important features. First, it is the first application of 
the Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition method to the measurement of nationality 
discrimination. Second, Haig recognized that racial and nationality discrimination may be correlated, 
hence the importance of controlling for both race and national origin when testing for nationality 
discrimination. Studying nearly 15,000 Australian males, he found that while immigrants earn about 6 
percent more and have larger human capital endowments than natives, had they received the same 
returns to their human capital endowments as natives immigrants would have earned 9 percent more. 
Haig took this as evidence of a ceteris paribus earnings differential attributable to nationality 
discrimination of approximately 3 percent.  
Reimers (1984) also recognized the importance of controlling for both race and nativity status 
in a study of native/immigrant earnings differences. She analyzed data for Hispanic men in the U.S., 
finding no evidence of ceteris paribus earnings differences between foreign-born Hispanics and native 
non-Hispanics, but some evidence indicating differences in rates of return to education and experience 
between the two groups. She made no mention of discrimination as a possible reason for these 
differences.   
The first U.S. study to focus on identifying nationality discrimination is Gabriel and Schmitz’s 
(1987) investigation of native and immigrant male earnings. Using data from the 1980 Census of 
Population and applying the decomposition method, they estimated two models which differ with 
respect to how the foreign-born earnings equation is specified. In their “basic” model, Gabriel and 
Schmitz have no controls for earnings assimilation, whereas in their “refined” model the foreign-born 
equation did include such controls. They found for the basic model that a relatively small proportion 
                                                 
11 Haig measured experience by age, where age was only measured in intervals. Furthermore,  his data set contains very 
little information on personal characteristics 
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(approximately 13%) of the native/immigrant mean earnings gap was attributable to discrimination 
against foreign-born workers. However, in their refined model, Gabriel and Schmitz observed an 
immigrant earnings premium. These conflicting results were taken as “…rather inconclusive evidence 
of earnings discrimination against foreign-born workers…” (p. 99).   
The Gabriel and Schmitz (1987) did set a landmark in the literature because a larger proportion 
of subsequent studies made estimating nationality discrimination the focus, and the decomposition 
technique became the dominant empirical methodology for estimating nationality discrimination. Tran-
Nam and Neville (1988), Daneshvary and Weber (1991), and Daneshvary (1993) used the 
decomposition method to provide evidence of discrimination against Australian immigrants (Tran-Nam 
and Neville) and U.S. immigrants (Daneshvary and Weber and Danehsvary). Beach and Worswick 
(1993), Shamsuddin (1998) and Hayfron (2002) estimated earnings equations which control for both 
gender and nationality. These authors argued that female immigrants can experience a “double negative 
effect” on earnings from gender discrimination and nationality discrimination. They provided evidence 
of this double negative effect in Canada (Beach and Worswick and Shamsuddin) and Norway 
(Hayfron). Kee (1995) studied nationality discrimination against Dutch immigrants, finding evidence 
of discrimination against members of several nationality groups. 
Bucci and Tenorio (1997) used U.S. Census data to provide evidence of nepotism towards 
native-born workers. In a study of American and foreign-born scientists working in the U.S., Goyette 
and Xie (1999) reported that female immigrants are less likely to get hired and promoted than their 
immigrant male and native-born female counterparts They suggested that this may be a result of the 
“immigration path” (p. 407) taken by many female scientists and engineers, as wives of immigrant 
men.  In a study of the Danish labor market, Nielsen, et al (2004) extended the decomposition 
technique to allow for the disentangling of the three sources of native-immigrant earnings differences 
discussed earlier. They found evidence of discrimination against female immigrants.  
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     Three studies have tested for nationality discrimination in professional sports. Wilson and Ying 
(2003) tested for the effects of team nationality composition on fan attendance in the World’s five 
largest football leagues. They found some evidence suggesting that employer discrimination is 
responsible for under-representation of various player nationalities. Pedace (2008) studied English 
soccer and found evidence of employer nepotism in favor of some South American players. 
Bodvarsson and Fuess (2008) studied Major League Baseball and found that foreign-born hitters 
subject to the Reserve Clause (players for whom the team owner has monopsony power) are 
disadvantaged in the bargaining process relative to American-born players, all other things equal. 
Unlike Pedace, Bodvarsson and Fuess control for the potentially confounding effects of race. 
Our assessment of the aforementioned literature on nationality discrimination leads us to 
conclude the following. Nationality discrimination appears across a majority of studies to be an 
important contributor to immigrant earnings, especially for certain countries, nationality groups, and 
occupations. However, the literature lacks a theory of nationality discrimination that is capable of 
producing testable implications regarding the joint influences of native/immigrant productivity 
differences and discrimination. Furthermore, many of the data sets used in the previously discussed 
studies lack the breadth and depth of micro-data needed to produce accurate estimates of nationality 
discrimination. The goal of our research below is to resolve these deficiencies. 
II. A theory of nationality discrimination 
II.1 The problem setting 
Suppose production is done using three inputs – units of native-born labor, units of foreign-born labor, 
and capital. Capital is assumed to be fixed. Native- and foreign-born workers are assumed to perform 
the same job assignment, but are imperfect substitutes.  The imperfect substitutability arises from 
immigrant workers having acquired their skill sets in their home countries, where educational systems 
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and labor markets are different.  Differences in schooling, on-the-job-training, culture and traditions, 
etc., all contribute to differences in human capital endowments between natives and immigrants. To 
quote Ottaviano and Peri (2005), “Since foreign-born workers receive [at least part] of their education 
abroad, they are likely to retain different abilities pertaining to language, quantitative skills, and so on. 
Therefore they should be differentiated enough to be treated as imperfect substitutes for U.S.-born 
workers, even within the same education and experience group” (our italics for emphasis).12 
Assume that technology is characterized by the Generalized Leontief Production function:13  
(1) 
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where Q is output, LN is the quantity of native-born labor, LI is the quantity of immigrant labor, and 
ijγ is a technology coefficient. Using an approach similar to Kahn (1991), we include the parameter D, 
0 < D < 1, above as a measure of the strength of customer prejudice against immigrant workers. 
Customer prejudice may be viewed as a situation where customers discount the marginal revenue 
product (MRP) of immigrant labor. The lower (higher) is D, the more (less) intense the prejudice and 
the lower (higher) is immigrant MRP.14 If D equals 1, there is no prejudice. While a more traditional 
approach would be to think of customer discrimination as implying a price discount on the output of 
immigrant workers, the approach above is equivalent. The parameter D reflects the idea that immigrant 
labor input is valued less when customers are prejudiced. Note also that the above production function 
                                                 
12 Ottaviano and Peri (2005, pp. 7-8). 
13 See Diewert (1971). 
14 Note that MRP of immigrant labor is ])([ 2
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will unambiguously  reduce immigrant MRP regardless of whether the two groups are substitutes or complements. 
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is constant returns to scale and imposes restrictions on each technology coefficient such that ijγ = jiγ . 
The sign of each technology coefficient indicates whether inputs i and j are substitutes ( ijγ < 0) or 
complements ( ijγ > 0). 
We will assume that the product and labor markets are perfectly competitive and that product 
price is normalized at unity. Assume that Nr and Ir are the market wages of native- and foreign-born 
workers, respectively. The firm’s profit function is thus 
(2) IINNji
j i
ij LrLrDLL −−=∑∑ 2
1
)]([γpi ,  (i, j = N, I). 
If firms maximize profits and face constant input prices, the labor market will establish the following 
system of labor demand functions: 
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While equations (3) and (4) are not reduced form expressions, they provide some very useful 
implications. The wage paid to workers comprising a particular group depends upon four factors: (i) 
the  productivities  of workers in that group; (ii) the strength of customer prejudice against immigrant 
workers; (iii) the degrees of substitutability or complementarity between the two labor groups; and (iv) 
the relative supplies of labor in each group. For example, the immigrant wage (equation (4)) depends 
upon immigrant productivity (reflected by IIγ )
15, prejudice (D), the degrees of substitutability or 
                                                 
15 Note that γII is not precisely the marginal productivity of immigrants, but is correlated with it. If γII rises (falls), the 
marginal productivity curve will shift up (down). For example, an increase in IIγ could result from a technological advance, 
an increase in the average human capital endowment of each worker, or some other exogenous change. 
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complementarity between natives and immigrants ( NIγ ), and the relative supply of native workers 
(
I
N
L
L
).  
Equations (3) and (4) have immediate implications for how a change in the intensity of prejudice 
affects each group’s wage. An increase in prejudice will always reduce the immigrant wage, but the 
effect on the native wage will depend upon whether the two groups are substitutes or complements. 
According to equation (3), if natives and immigrants are complements an increase in prejudice will 
reduce the native wage. The reason is that increased prejudice has the effect of reducing the benefits 
from complementarity;  Immigrant MRP falls, leading to less employment of immigrants, which in turn 
reduces native MRP and less employment of the latter group. When natives and immigrants are 
substitutes, the lower immigrant MRP induces employers to substitute natives for immigrants, 
stimulating native employment and wages.  
One particularly important insight from equations (3) and (4) is that the wage paid to workers of 
a particular group depends upon the amount of native/immigrant integration within and across groups. 
For example, according to equation (3), the wage paid to a native-born worker is affected by the 
number of immigrants per native. Furthermore, how natives are affected by an increase or a decrease in 
the number of immigrants depends upon both the technology coefficients and the intensity of prejudice 
against immigrants. If natives and immigrants are substitutes ( NIγ  < 0), then if more immigrants are 
hired the wage paid to natives will fall, all other things equal. However, the drop in that wage will be 
smaller (larger) the greater (lesser) is the degree of customer prejudice against immigrants.16 Thus, if 
natives and immigrants are substitutes, prejudice attenuates the adverse effects experienced by natives 
when more immigrants are hired and the degree of attenuation rises with the degree of prejudice. In 
                                                 
16 When natives and immigrants are substitutes, 
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 < 0 meaning that as customer prejudice rises, the drop in the 
wage paid to natives resulting from greater employment of immigrants will be less severe. 
14 
 
contrast, suppose that natives are complementary to immigrants (γNI> 0). Then an increase in the 
supply of immigrants will raise the wage paid to natives, all other things equal. However, the increase 
in that wage will be smaller (larger) the greater (lesser) is the degree of prejudice.17  Natives benefit 
from having more immigrants, but prejudice effectively “taxes” that benefit.  
There are similar implications for immigrant wages. If natives and immigrants are substitutes 
then greater employment of natives reduces the immigrant wage, but that wage falls less the greater is 
the amount of prejudice. Immigrant wages have less distance to fall in an environment of greater 
prejudice when relative employment of natives rises.  In contrast, if the two group are complements, 
then greater hiring of natives will raise the wage of immigrants, but the wage rises less the greater is 
prejudice.  This is an indirect adverse effect of prejudice on immigrants: Immigrants are harmed 
directly because customers value their output less, and indirectly because prejudice reduces the benefits 
enjoyed by immigrants from having a complementary relationship in production with natives.  
The next step in the analysis is to extend Becker’s (1971) Market Discrimination Coefficient 
(MDC) concept to the case of nationality discrimination when there is imperfect substitutability 
between the majority group and the minority group. The MDC in this case measures the percentage 
earnings premium paid to native workers due to being native-born.  Applying Becker’s (1971, p. 17) 
general version of the MDC to the case of nationality discrimination, the MDC is:18 
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 > 0, meaning that as customer prejudice falls, the gain in the 
wage paid to natives resulting from greater employment of immigrants will be larger. 
18 This expression is identical to Becker’s general expression for the MDC, which he treats as the economy-wide wage gap 
when there is employment discrimination. 
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The first term on the right-hand side of (5) is the native/immigrant wage ratio when there is prejudice, 
whereas the second term is the ratio in the absence of prejudice. The difference between the two ratios 
measures the ceteris paribus (adjusted for differences in productivity) nationality pay gap. Using 
expressions (3) and (4), it follows that  
 (6) =NIMDC = .
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According to equation (6), discrimination depends upon the strength of customer prejudice, 
native/immigrant productivity differences, the degree of substitutability or complementarity between 
natives and immigrants, and the relative supplies of native and immigrant labor.   
Equation (6) provides some novel implications: We begin with a basic, intuitive one, though: 
(i) Nationality discrimination is larger the greater is the degree of customer prejudice    
Proof 
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to the customer prejudice parameter (D), we obtain 
(7)  .
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If the two groups of labor are substitutes (γNI < 0), then the first ratio to the right of the equal sign in 
expression (7) is negative. Since the second ratio is positive, expression (7) is guaranteed to be 
negative, meaning that a decrease in D (strengthening of customers’ distaste for immigrants) raises the 
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amount of market discrimination ( 0<
∂
∂
D
MDC NI ). If the two groups are complements (γNI > 0), then 
expression (7) will also be negative. To see this, manipulation of expression (7) leads to the finding 
that 
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Assuming that the product of the wages exceeds one and since γII > 0, the expression 2
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The above prediction provides the foundation for another prediction, which is less intuitive, not implied 
by the standard discrimination model, and has very important empirical implications: 
(ii)  The marginal effect of increased prejudice on nationality discrimination is less for higher-
productivity immigrants. 
Proof 
The productivity of immigrant labor is reflected in the intercept term (γII). If one differentiates 
expression (6) with respect to this intercept term, the following expression is obtained:           
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Using the guidelines for signing expression (8), expression (9) will be negative, meaning that the 
marginal effect of prejudice on the MDC declines as immigrant workers become more productive. 
What this means is that should there be an intensification of customer prejudice against immigrants, 
higher-productivity immigrants will experience less of an increase in discrimination than lower-
productivity immigrants. There are several important implications here. First, race and productivity 
interact, something not implied by the standard discrimination model. Second, in an empirical 
specification where the goal is to estimate the extent of nationality discrimination, one must include an 
interaction term between race and productivity to avoid omitted variables bias. 
     There are two other predictions that relate to worker productivity: 
(iii) If immigrant workers become more productive, then pay discrimination against them falls  
Proof 
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to γII, we obtain 
(10) 
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Note that the ratio on the left-hand side of expression (11) is less than one, whilst the expression on the 
right-hand side exceeds one, guaranteeing that expression (11) is always negative. Regardless of the 
signs and magnitudes of the technology coefficients and the relative supplies of each labor type, 
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nationality discrimination falls whenever immigrant labor improves its productivity.  For example, a 
technological advance that makes immigrants more efficient results in less discrimination against them. 
In terms of the two wage ratios in expression (6), an increase in immigrant productivity causes the 
relative native wage with prejudice to fall and the wage without prejudice to fall as well, but the former 
falls proportionately more than the latter and there will be a net reduction in the MDC; 
(iv) If native workers become more productive, then discrimination against immigrants rises. 
An increase in native worker productivity is manifested by an increase in the intercept of the native 
marginal product function (γNN). Differentiating expression (6) with respect to this parameter, we 
obtain  
(12) 
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The numerator in the first ratio on the right hand side of expression (12) is less than the numerator in 
the second ratio, guaranteeing that expression (12) is always positive. When native workers experience 
increases in productivity, their relative wage when there is prejudice against immigrants rises 
proportionately more than the wage in the absence of prejudice. The productivity increase has the 
unintended consequence of exacerbating the amount of discrimination directed towards immigrants. 
The preceding two comparative static results have an important implication: When immigrants 
and natives are not perfect substitutes, the amount of market discrimination against immigrants 
depends upon relative productivity. Immigrants can help themselves overcome discrimination by 
boosting their productivities, e.g. through additional human capital investments, improved health and 
motivation, etc. There is also a policy implication: Public money used to train and educate immigrants 
in the host country could lead to reduced discrimination. However, there is an unintended consequence 
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of improved productivity of native-born workers: If natives invest relatively more in their human 
capital endowments than immigrants, this will lead to more discrimination. 
(v) An increase in the relative supply of immigrants increases the amount of nationality 
discrimination 
Proof 
An important property of the demand functions that are generated by the Generalized Leontief 
production function is that equilibrium factor prices depend upon relative factor supply. What does an 
increase in relative immigrant supply do to the MDC?  Differentiating expression (6) with respect to 
relative immigrant supply, we obtain 
(13) 
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Assume that natives and immigrants are substitutes. Then, expression (13) will be negative (positive) if 
the first ratio to the right of the equal sign is greater in absolute value than the second ratio, i.e.  
(14) 
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Since D < 1, the expression 
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is the larger one, confirming a negative sign for 
expression (14). The implication is that if residents of the host country harbor prejudice towards 
immigrants and there is an influx of new immigrants, there will be an increase in the amount of 
nationality discrimination. Conversely, the implication is that restrictive immigration policies will help 
to eradicate the extent of nationality discrimination. 
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III. A Test Case: Major League Baseball 
III.1 Description of the Test Case 
In this section, we test some implications of the above model. We chose an industry where: (a) there 
are very accurate data on salaries and productivities for individual workers; (b) there is a history of 
immigration and native/immigrant integration in the firm’s work force;  (c) worker race and gender can 
be observed; and (d) there is potential for customer discrimination. One industry satisfying all these 
criteria is Major League Baseball (MLB) in the USA.19 In MLB, each team requires two distinctly 
complementary types of player skill - hitting (an offensive skill) and pitching (a defensive skill) - in the 
production of baseball entertainment. The industry has a long history of both immigration and racial 
integration. For many years, MLB has recruited players from Latin American countries, Canada, 
Australia, Japan, and other countries. 
 The ideal way to measure a Major League player’s marginal revenue product (MRP) is by his 
contribution to the team’s ticket, broadcasting and merchandise revenues. Because of the team 
production nature of baseball, however, it is impossible to empirically disentangle one player’s revenue 
contribution from another. We thus proxy MRP by the player’s years of MLB experience, tenure with 
his current team, and various career statistics (computed on a game-by-game basis since the beginning 
of the player’s Major League career) that proxy his ability and skills. The career statistics we use to 
measure a hitter’s productivity include at bats, stolen bases, bases on balls, total bases, slugging 
average and batting average.20 We distinguish between hitters that are ‘designated hitters’ from those 
                                                 
19 Discrimination in the professional sports labor market has received considerable attention among labor economists 
because of the abundant statistical evidence on a player’s personal attributes, compensation and productivity. Most studies 
in this area have focused on racial discrimination with respect to pay, hiring, retention and positional segregation. For an 
examination of the research, see Kahn’s (2000) expository survey.  
20 A player has an at bat every time he comes to bat, except in certain circumstances, e.g. if he is awarded first base due to 
interference or obstruction or the inning ends while he is still at bat. A hitter is assigned a stolen base (also called a ‘steal’) 
when he reaches an extra base on a hit from another player. For example, suppose that hitter A is at first base when hitter B 
hits the ball. Hitter B reaches first base (he would be assigned a ‘single’), but hitter A reaches third base. Hitter A would be 
assigned a stolen base because he reached an extra base. A base on balls (also called a ‘walk’) is assigned when the batter 
receives four pitches which the umpire determines is a ‘ball.’ A ball is any pitch at which the batter does not swing and is 
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who are not. A designated hitter is a player who is chosen at the start of the game to bat in lieu of the 
pitcher in the lineup. We also distinguish, using dummies, between hitters that serve other types of 
positions. These include whether the hitter served as an infielder or a catcher.21 We measure a pitcher’s 
productivity by use of the following career statistics: Wins, Losses, Games Started, Complete Games, 
Saves, Homeruns, Walks, Strikeouts, Innings Pitched, Earned Run Average (ERA,) and Strikeout 
Rate.
22 
III. 2 Empirical Analysis 
Our empirical analysis is set out in Tables 1-6. Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for hitters and 
pitchers, respectively. Our full sample comprises 1093 hitters (901 native, 192 immigrant; 549 white 
and 544 nonwhite) and 1203 pitchers (1031 native, 172 immigrant;  941 white and 262 nonwhite). 
Salary, experience, performance and position data were drawn from the Lahman Baseball Database 
(see: www.baseball1.com) over four seasons - 1992, 1993, 1997 and 1998. The salary data do not 
                                                                                                                                                                       
out of the ‘strike zone’ (which means it would not qualify to be a strike). When the hitter is assigned a base on balls, he is 
entitled to walk to first base. Total bases are the number of bases a player has gained through hitting. It is the sum of his hits 
weighted by 1 for a single, 2 for a double (if he gets to second base as a result of his hit), 3 for a triple (if he gets to third 
base) and 4 for a home run. A hitter’s batting average is the ratio of hits to at bats; this measures the hitter’s success rate. 
Slugging percentage, a related measure, reflects hitting power, which is total bases divided by at bats. 
21 An infielder is a defensive player who plays on the ‘infield,’ the dirt portion of a baseball diamond between first and third 
bases. The specific infielder positions are first baseman, second baseman, shortstop (which is between second and third 
bases) and third baseman. In contrast, an ‘outfielder’ plays farthest from the batter and his primary role is to catch long fly 
balls. Outfielder positions include left fielder, center fielder and right fielder. The catcher crouches behind home plate and 
receives the ball from the pitcher. Because the catcher can see the whole field, he is best positioned to lead and direct his 
fellow players in play. He typically calls the pitches by means of hand signals, hence requires awareness of both the 
pitcher’s mechanics and the strengths and weaknesses of the batter. 
22 A pitcher is assigned a win or a loss depending on whether he was the pitcher of record when the decisive run was scored. 
One is the pitcher of record if one is the pitcher at the point when the player who scores the decisive run is allowed to reach 
a base. Games started is the number of times the pitcher was given the ball to start a game, whereas games finished is the 
number of times the pitcher was throwing on the mound during the final out (which is any failed attempt by a hitter to 
advance to a base). A shutout is a game in which one team does not score any runs. A pitcher earns a save if he is able to 
hold a lead for his team at the end of the game. Pitchers who earn saves, called relievers, tend not to gain wins, so it is 
customary to treat saves and wins equally, especially when studying pitcher salaries. Number of home runs, which is 
assumed to be negatively related to salary, is the number of pitches that were hit by batters which were scored as a home 
run. A pitcher is assigned a walk, which is assumed to be negatively related to salary, if he allows a batter to reach base after 
pitching him four balls. He is assigned a strikeout if he pitches three strikes (pitched balls counted against the batter, 
typically swung at and missed or fouled off) in a row. An inning is one of nine periods in a MLB game in which each team 
has a turn at bat; innings pitched is the number of such periods when the pitcher was working. Earned run average is 
negatively correlated with the pitcher’s ability to prevent the opposing team from scoring. It equals the number of times the 
pitcher allows a batter to score a run (where the batter scores a point by advancing around the bases and reaching home 
plate safely) x 9, divided by the number of innings pitched. Finally the strikeout rate is the percentage of times the pitcher 
has succeeded in striking a batter out. 
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include information about contract length, bonus clauses or endorsements. Salaries for players on the 
Canadian teams were converted to U.S. dollars. The experience data were used to set controls for a 
player’s eligibility for free agency and final offer arbitration.23 The player’s race was inferred from 
inspection of Topps baseball cards for all four seasons. For the U.S. teams, metropolitan area 
population and per-capita income were obtained from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(see: www.bea.gov). For the Canadian teams, similar data were obtained from the Statistics Canada 
website (see: www.statcan.ca). Per-capita income data for the Canadian cities were converted to U.S. 
dollars. 
It appears from Table 1 that immigrant hitters (who are overwhelmingly non-white) are 
generally quite similar to their native-born peers in terms of their personal characteristics and in terms 
of the types of markets in which they play. In terms of their professional characteristics, however, 
immigrants tend to have less MLB experience, less tenure with their current club, and are less likely to 
be eligible for final offer arbitration than their native-born counterparts. In terms of performance, 
immigrant hitters record fewer At Bats, Stolen Bases, Bases on Balls and Total Bases than native-born 
hitters, are less likely to be catchers, but more likely to be designated hitters. 
It also appears from Table 1 that there are no major differences between the personal and 
professional characteristics of white and nonwhite hitters, nor in the characteristics of the greater 
metropolitan areas in which they play. In terms of career characteristics, however, nonwhite hitters 
record significantly more At Bats, Stolen Bases and Total Bases than white hitters. They are also less 
likely to play as an infielder or catcher, but are more likely to play as an outfielder or as a designated 
hitter.  
                                                 
23 In MLB, player salaries are set under two regimes, one competitive, the other monopsonistic. The monopsonistic regime 
applies to players with fewer than six years of league experience. These players are subject to the reserve clause and are 
constrained to negotiate their pay with only one team. The competitive regime applies to players with at least 6 years of 
league experience. They are eligible to file for free agency and may negotiate with any team in the league. Monopsony 
power effectively begins to erode, however, as early as the fourth year because then a player is eligible for final offer 
arbitration. Arbitration rights tend to relieve players of monopsonistic exploitation because arbitrators strive to award 
competitive salaries. The Major League added new teams (called ‘expansion teams’) since the early 1990s, leading to a 
reduction in each team’s monopsony power held over reserve clause players. 
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In Table 2, the domination of native and white pitchers is immediately apparent. Pitchers are 
predominately white natives – 78 percent of pitchers are white, 86 percent of pitchers are native, 89 
percent of native pitchers are white, and 97 per cent of white pitchers are native. Relative to their non-
white and immigrant counterparts, white and native pitchers enjoy higher average earnings, are 
generally older, have greater MLB experience and tenures with their current club, and are more likely 
to be free agents.  In terms of career characteristics, white and native pitchers record significantly 
higher Wins, Losses, Games Started, Complete Games, Shutouts, Saves, Homeruns, Walks, Strikeouts 
and Innings Pitched. 
 We tested several implications of our theoretical model using OLS, the results of which are 
presented in Tables 3 and 4, where we set out earnings regressions for Hitters and Pitchers, 
respectively. Note that for the nativity status dummy (“Native”), the player is assigned a one if native-
born and zero otherwise, as well as a one if white (and zero otherwise).  We estimate six specifications 
vis. (1) All; (2) Natives; (3) Immigrants; (4) Whites; (5) Non-Whites; and (6) All with interactions 
between the nativity status dummy and the various productivity indicators. 
 Looking at Hitters first (Table 3), it is evident that the regressions are generally well specified, 
and that the coefficients on the explanatory variables are generally robust, across all the various 
specifications. Earnings are negatively related to Age but positively and concavely related to MLB 
Experience. It would appear that the negative coefficient on Age is reflecting the player’s physical 
depreciation, whilst the positive coefficient on experience is reflecting rewards to greater human capital 
– indeed when we experimented with dropping age from our regressions we found that the coefficient 
on MLB Experience declined by almost exactly the size of the coefficient on Age. Earnings are also 
positively and significantly related to Tenure with Current Club and also to whether the player is a 
Free Agent or Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration. Career characteristics are dominated by the effects 
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of a player’s Slugging and Batting Average, although At Bats and Stolen Bases exert small, but 
significant effects on earnings.  
 Two implications of our model are that: (a) If there is discrimination against (in favor of) 
immigrants, the coefficient on the nativity status dummy will be positive (negative) and significant; 
and (b) productivity and nativity status will interact (the marginal effect of nativity status on pay 
depends upon how productive one is). For hitters, we found no evidence of differences in intercepts 
between natives and immigrants. Thus, hypothesis (a) is not confirmed for hitters.  However, there is 
some evidence indicating confirmation of hypothesis (b) for the hitter group. Note from specification 
(6) of Table 3 that three of the nativity status x productivity interactions are significant, as are the 
interactions between nativity status and tenure with current club and with playing on a Canadian team.  
 Turning to pitchers (Table 4), we find – somewhat surprisingly – that Age impacts positively on 
the earnings of immigrant and nonwhite pitchers, MLB Experience impacts positively on the earnings 
of all pitchers and that Tenure with Current Club impacts positively upon the earnings of all but 
immigrant pitchers. The coefficients on the productivity variables generally accord to a priori 
expectations, although there are some noticeable discrepancies across the various sub-sample 
regressions. For example, the pay of non-white and immigrant, but not white or native, pitchers is 
significantly and positively related to Wins, and significantly and negatively related to Games Started. 
The pay of white, native and immigrant pitchers, but not non-white pitchers, is significantly and 
positively related to Saves whilst the pay of white and native, but not non-white or immigrant, pitchers 
is significantly and negatively related to Shut Outs, Home Runs and ERA’s.  
 In terms of nationality discrimination within the pitcher group, our analysis confirms some 
implications of our theoretical model. There is evidence from Table 4 of reverse nationality 
discrimination for the pooled sample and for the subsample of non-white pitchers: In the pooled group, 
native-born pitchers make 10.3% less than their immigrant counterparts, all other things equal; In the 
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non-white subsample, native-born pitchers make 19.4% less, all other things equal. This effect for the 
pooled sample falls away when the nativity status x productivity interactions are added in specification 
(6). Nevertheless, specification (6) indicates fairly substantial premia paid to immigrants, even after 
controlling for race. According to specification (6), four of the nativity status x productivity 
interactions are significant, again confirming the model’s implication – perhaps more strongly for 
pitchers than for hitters - that the marginal effect of nativity status varies with productivity. Finally, we 
note that four of the nativity status x professional characteristics interactions are also significant  
III. 3 Decomposition Analysis 
In this section, we attempt to identify nationality discrimination using another empirical approach. The 
fact that players of a particular nativity group enjoy a mean wage differential over players of another 
nativity group could be a reflection of the former group’s greater endowment of ‘earning 
characteristics’. Native-born pitchers may, for example, be more productive or have more experience 
on average than immigrant pitchers. Alternatively, native-born pitchers may be better rewarded for the 
characteristics they do possess, suggesting some form of positive (negative) discrimination against 
native-born pitchers. To address this issue we perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to separate the 
native/immigrant mean earnings differential into an ‘endowment component’, to account for 
differences in endowments between individuals, and a ‘price component’, which is usually associated 
with discrimination.24  
Assume that the earnings function of players of nativity j in position i is: 
(15)  lnw
ij = ΧijΒij + ε ij  
                                                 
24 This method of decomposition, initially proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), and later generalized by Oaxaca 
and Ransom (1994), has been applied extensively to discrimination on the basis of gender, race, caste and religion. 
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where i = N, I( )  and j = H ,P( ) denote native and immigrant and pitchers and hitters respectively.  Χij  
denotes a vectors of explanatory variables,  Β
ij  the corresponding coefficient vectors to be estimated, 
and  ε
ij  some well-behaved error term. Thus, the earnings functions of native-born pitchers, immigrant 
pitchers, native-born hitters and immigrant hitters may be denoted: 
(16)  lnw
NH = ΧNHΒNH + ε NH  
(17)  lnw
IH = Χ IHΒIH + ε IH  
(18)  lnw
NP = ΧNPΒNP + ε NP  
(19)  lnw
IP = Χ IPΒIP + ε IP  
The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition divides wage differentials into a part that is ‘explained’ by group 
differences in productivity and a residual part that cannot be accounted for by such differences in wage 
determinants. This latter ‘unexplained’ component is often used as a measure for discrimination. For 
example, the predicted average native hitter/immigrant hitter (NH-IH) differential may be represented 
as: 
(20) 
∆ lnwNH − IH = lnwNH − lnwNNH = ΧNH ΒˆNH − Χ IH ΒˆIH
⇒
∆ lnwNH − IH = ΒˆIH ΧNH − Χ IH( )+ ΧNH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( )
 
The first term, ΒˆIH ΧNH − Χ IH( ), represents differences in endowments between members of the two 
groups whilst the second term, ΧNH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( ), represents differences in rewards. Note that if the 
overall differential is negative (i.e.  ∆ lnw
NH − IH < 0 ) but the second term is positive  
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(i.e. ΧNH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( )> 0 ), then it would suggest that immigrant hitters are discriminated against 
despite earning, on average, more than native hitters. In other words, immigrant hitters would do even 
better with the earnings generating function of native hitters than with their own.  
 Specification (20) presumes that the immigrant hitter wage structure prevails in the absence of 
discrimination. But this is a matter of debate. Assuming away any feelings of malevolence or 
benevolence from one group towards the other, then it is equally valid to presume that the native hitter 
wage structure prevails, thereby requiring (20) to be re-specified as: 
(21) ∆ lnwNH − IH = ΒˆNH ΧNH − Χ IH( )+ Χ IH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( ) 
The first and second terms on the right hand side of (21) still represent differences in endowments and 
rewards respectively, but they will generally differ from those derived from equation (21).25 Many 
authors concede this ambiguity by simply reporting both decompositions. Some researchers, however, 
have attempted to confront the issue head-on by hypothesizing the non-discriminatory parameter 
vector, Β , directly.26 Reimers (1983), for example, proposes using the average coefficients over both 
groups as an estimate of Β . Neumark (1988) advocates using the coefficients from a pooled regression 
over both groups as an estimate of Β . In what follows, we follow the ‘hybrid’ decomposition technique 
popularized by Cotton (1988) in which the prevailing non-discriminatory wage structure is assumed to 
be a weighted average of the wage structures of the two groups under consideration: 
(22) ∆ lnwNH − IH = ΧNH ΒˆNH − Β( )+ Χ IH Β− ΒˆIH( )+ Β ΧNH − Χ IH( ) 
                                                 
25 The point that an undervaluation of one group implies an overvaluation of the other is neatly summarized by Cotton 
(1988, p. 238): ‘… not only is the group discriminated against undervalued, but the preferred group is overvalued, and the 
undervaluation of the one subsidizes the overvaluation of the other.’  
26 Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) provide an integrative treatment of the various methods. 
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where Β= ΩΒˆNH + 1− Ω( )ΒˆIH  represents the estimated non-discriminatory parameter vector, with Ω  
denoting the proportion of the sample comprised by native hitters. The first right-hand term in the 
decomposition is the overpayment enjoyed by native hitters, the second term is the underpayment 
suffered by immigrant hitters, and the third term is the portion of the wage differential that is explained 
by differences in endowments. We perform the above three decompositions for the native /immigrant 
hitter and native /immigrant pitcher differentials, and our results, based on the regressions set out in 
Tables 3-4, are collected in Tables 5 and 6. 
 Considering Table 5, our regression model implies a positive salary premium for native hitters 
over immigrant hitters ceteris paribus. The first two decompositions, which follow specifications (20) 
and (21), respectively, in presuming that the immigrant hitter and native hitter wage structure would 
prevail in the absence of any discrimination, suggests that this premium is predominately explained by 
endowments. Decomposition based on the immigrant hitter wage structure suggests that 95 per cent of 
the differential is attributable to the superior endowments of native hitters, with only 5 per cent being 
attributable to price effects. Decomposition based on the native hitter wage structure suggests that 
differences in endowments explain 86 per cent of the differential, with discrimination against native 
hitters reducing the wage differential by 14 per cent. The hybrid decomposition, derived from 
specification (22), echoes the finding that the differential is almost entirely endowment driven, with 
native hitter overpayment and immigrant hitter underpayment offsetting the potential native hitter wage 
premium by 0.75 per cent and 11.6 per cent, respectively. Thus, the decomposition results basically 
confirm the OLS results, namely that there is no compelling evidence of nationality discrimination 
either against or in favor of immigrant hitters. 
 Table 6 focuses on the native /immigrant pitcher differential, and the results here are in stark 
contrast to what we found from our OLS analyses. The decompositions based on both native pitcher 
and immigrant pitcher wage structures suggest that the substantially superior endowments of native 
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pitchers are matched by equally substantial discrimination against immigrant pitchers, resulting in a 
negligible net potential wage differential. The hybrid decomposition suggests that it is the 
underpayment of immigrant pitchers, rather than the overpayment of native pitchers, that is acting to 
offset the endowment effect. In fact, the absolute value of the contribution of the immigrant 
underpayment to the native/immigrant mean earnings differential is almost the same as the contribution 
of the endowment effect. These results disconfirm the evidence from OLS, which indicated reverse 
discrimination. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Nationality discrimination is a particularly challenging type of discrimination to detect empirically 
because in most data sets of immigrants and natives, the effects of birthplace on pay will be influenced 
by productivity differences between natives and immigrants. This interrelatedness will occur anytime 
one is studying differences in pay between majority and minority workers when the two groups are 
imperfect substitutes. A very strong argument can be made for native/immigrant productivity 
differences because most immigrants need to assimilate to the host economy. If they also experience 
nationality discrimination, any theory and test of discrimination must account for the joint effects of 
birthplace and productivity differences. We suspect that most researchers have shied away from the 
study of nationality discrimination because of this problem of “disentangling,” to use the language of 
Nielsen et al (2004).  
In this paper, we have attempted to address the problem of how to measure nationality 
discrimination from both theoretical and empirical points of view. We developed a model of 
native/immigrant earnings differences that accounts for the joint effects of birthplace and productivity 
differences. Our key theoretical concept is an extension of Becker’s traditional measure of 
discrimination, the Market Discrimination Coefficient (MDC), to the case of nationality discrimination 
when majority and minority workers are imperfect substitutes. Our MDC successfully allows one to 
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tease out the contribution of productivity differences from the contribution of prejudice to the 
native/immigrant earnings wage gap. This has not done been done before theoretically and we contend 
that laying the theoretical groundwork is very helpful when it comes to designing an empirical 
specification. Our theoretical model produces a number of counterintuitive implications that are easily 
testable. 
Another factor that has hampered the study of nationality discrimination in the past has been the 
absence of test cases that lend themselves well to estimating discrimination when there are 
majority/minority productivity differences. To test our model, we chose a particular industry that’s very 
amenable to the study of nationality discrimination – Major League Baseball. Our examination of that 
industry yielded some very interesting results. First, we found evidence of nationality discrimination in 
the pitchers group – OLS results showing reverse discrimination and decompositions showing 
discrimination against immigrants. Because the decomposition technique is now generally recognized 
as the stronger, more informative, of the techniques for detecting discrimination, we are inclined to 
attach more credibility to the decompositions. The  discrimination against immigrant pitchers we 
observe was quite substantial for the 1990s. However, we found no evidence of discrimination for or 
against hitters. This leads to a future research questions: Why, within the same industry, as well as 
within the same firm, does one observe discrimination in one occupation or job assignment and not in 
another? 
Our empirical work also revealed confirmation of an important implication from our theory: 
Birthplace and productivity interact in the determination of pay. This is confirmation of a more general 
implication of our theory, which is that whenever majority and minority workers are imperfect 
substitutes in production, the personal attribute that is the focus of prejudice (race, gender, birthplace, 
etc.) will interact with relative productivity in influencing pay. Elsewhere (Bodvarsson and Sessions 
(2008)) we have found this to be true when studying racial discrimination across job assignments 
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within the firm. Therefore, future studies of nationality discrimination, as well as studies of 
discrimination in general where majority and minority workers are not perfect substitutes, must take 
account of interaction effects between productivity and birthplace. 
Now that a theory of nationality discrimination has been tested on a particular industry, the next 
step in this research area is to investigate discrimination for nationwide panel data sets. It will be 
interesting to see whether results from an inter-occupational nationwide study, particularly in countries 
where immigration is significant, will yield similar results to the ones found here. We hope our study 
spawns additional work in this area. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistic - Hitters 
 All Native Immigrant White Non-White 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Personal Characteristics     
Log Annual Salary 13.890 1.13 13.882 1.11 13.923 1.21 13.865 1.10 13.914 1.16
Age 30.304 3.70 30.538 3.69 29.208 3.58 30.596 3.49 30.011 3.88
White 0.502 0.50 0.600 0.49 0.042 0.20 - - - -
Non-White 0.498 0.50 0.400 0.49 0.958 0.20 - - - -
Native 0.824 0.38 - - - - 0.985 0.12 0.662 0.47
Immigrant 0.176 0.38 - - - - 0.015 0.12 0.338 0.47
Professional Characteristics     
MLB Experience 7.061 3.89 7.099 3.94 6.885 3.63 7.062 3.87 7.061 3.91
MLB Experience-Squared 64.957 69.31 65.900 71.49 60.531 57.96 64.785 70.06 65.131 68.6
Tenure with Current Club 2.672 3.00 2.772 3.13 2.203 2.22 3.062 3.38 2.279 2.50
Free Agent 0.600 0.49 0.597 0.49 0.615 0.49 0.597 0.49 0.603 0.49
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration 0.296 0.46 0.302 0.46 0.266 0.44 0.304 0.46 0.287 0.45
American League 0.514 0.50 0.498 0.50 0.589 0.49 0.521 0.50 0.507 0.50
National League 0.486 0.50 0.502 0.50 0.411 0.49 0.479 0.50 0.493 0.50
Canadian Team 0.073 0.26 0.060 0.24 0.135 0.34 0.067 0.25 0.079 0.27
Performance     
At Bats 2506.41 2001.58 2514.121 2042.69 2470.25 1800.64 2419.738 1940.51 2593.888 2059.46
Stolen Bases 69.746 112.52 70.825 119.51 64.693 71.11 44.800 72.35 94.925 137.54
Bases on Balls 254.275 247.74 263.865 258.01 209.271 186.42 253.131 233.32 255.428 261.69
Total Bases 1060.200 913.52 1066.499 934.2 1030.641 811.02 1016.772 880.39 1104.028 944.57
Slugging Average 0.407 0.06 0.408 0.06 0.401 0.07 0.404 0.06 0.410 0.07
Batting Average 0.267 0.03 0.267 0.02 0.266 0.02 0.264 0.02 0.269 0.02
Infielder 0.459 0.50 0.450 0.50 0.505 0.50 0.556 0.50 0.362 0.48
Outfielder 0.383 0.49 0.390 0.49 0.354 0.48 0.217 0.41 0.551 0.50
Catcher 0.116 0.32 0.122 0.33 0.089 0.28 0.189 0.39 0.042 0.20
Designated Hitter 0.059 0.24 0.054 0.23 0.078 0.27 0.046 0.21 0.072 0.26
Greater Metro Area Characteristics     
Percentage White 80.507 6.89 80.819 6.72 79.047 7.47 80.938 6.77 80.073 6.99
Percentage Black 13.273 6.58 13.312 6.61 13.086 6.47 12.959 6.6 13.589 6.56
Percentage Hispanic 10.621 10.65 10.559 10.69 10.913 10.45 10.719 10.8 10.522 10.50
Average Annual Income ($) 25562.99 3789.65 25514.71 3733.19 25789.51 4046.65 25508.57 3757.99 25617.9 3824
Population1 5514009 4657988 5412875 4595757 5988602 4924360 5313189 4509095 5716676 4799205
Year Dummies     
1992 0.250 0.43 0.251 0.43 0.245 0.43 0.255 0.44 0.244 0.43
1993 0.235 0.42 0.244 0.43 0.193 0.40 0.248 0.43 0.222 0.42
1997 0.260 0.44 0.255 0.44 0.281 0.45 0.248 0.43 0.272 0.45
1998 0.255 0.44 0.250 0.43 0.281 0.45 0.250 0.43 0.261 0.44
Sample Size 1093 901 192 549 544 
Note: 1. Population denotes the greater metro area population. 
Source: All variables except Race and Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, 
Release Date: Dec. 15, 2002). Race is derived form observed Topps Baseball Cards, years 92, 93, 94, 97, 99 (only years available). GMAC derived 
from the Statistical Abstract 1997-1999, the BEA, CA1-3, and from Statistical Canada.. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistic - Pitchers 
 All Native Immigrant White Non-White 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Personal Characteristics     
Log Annual Salary 13.409 1.19 13.441 1.20 13.213 1.15 13.451 1.20 13.258 1.17
Age 29.815 4.09 30.102 4.06 28.093 3.85 30.19 4.02 28.466 4.05
White 0.782 0.41 0.885 0.32 0.169 0.38 - - - -
Non-White 0.218 0.41 0.115 0.32 0.831 0.38 - - - -
Native 0.857 0.35 - - - - 0.969 0.17 0.454 0.50
Immigrant 0.143 0.35 - - - - 0.031 0.17 0.546 0.50
Professional Characteristics     
MLB Experience 5.988 4.20 6.184 4.27 4.808 3.56 6.158 4.20 5.374 4.14
MLB Experience-Squared 53.468 76.64 56.43 78.98 35.692 57.85 55.562 78.38 45.939 69.64
Tenure with Current Club 1.924 2.07 1.955 2.11 1.738 1.85 1.935 2.10 1.885 1.98
Free Agent 0.467 0.50 0.485 0.50 0.355 0.48 0.482 0.50 0.412 0.49
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration 0.306 0.46 0.300 0.46 0.343 0.48 0.314 0.46 0.279 0.45
American League 0.513 0.50 0.524 0.50 0.448 0.50 0.518 0.50 0.496 0.50
National League 0.487 0.50 0.476 0.50 0.552 0.50 0.482 0.50 0.504 0.50
Canadian Team 0.069 0.25 0.057 0.23 0.14 0.35 0.063 0.24 0.092 0.29
Performance     
Starter 0.442 0.50 0.436 0.50 0.477 0.50 0.441 0.50 0.447 0.50
Wins 37.446 44.33 39.124 45.39 27.378 35.82 39.007 45.27 31.832 40.37
Losses 34.179 37.05 35.593 37.86 25.692 30.50 35.904 38.37 27.973 31.13
Games Started 74.12 105.53 76.83 107.99 57.855 87.82 77.769 108.53 61.00 92.93
Complete Games 10.15 22.24 10.677 22.85 6.983 17.86 10.981 23.33 7.16 17.48
Shutouts 2.875 6.08 2.997 6.24 2.14 4.94 3.065 6.32 2.191 5.06
Saves 19.488 51.87 21.257 54.87 8.878 25.42 20.941 52.93 14.267 47.62
Homeruns 56.517 62.57 58.619 63.93 43.907 52.12 58.842 64.46 48.16 54.54
Walks 225.779 249.73 234.708 255.69 172.204 202.97 231.782 257.66 204.195 217.94
Strikeouts 436.641 514.13 456.643 531.38 316.628 374.42 450.726 530.21 386.00 448.86
Innings Pitched 627.592 702.42 653.705 716.96 470.919 585.76 655.16 720.78 528.473 623.3
ERA 4.025 0.96 4.004 0.95 4.152 1.00 3.995 0.94 4.133 1.04
Strikeout Rate 0.078 0.02 0.078 0.02 0.079 0.02 0.078 0.02 0.081 0.02
Greater Metro Area Characteristics     
Percentage White 80.714 6.84 80.647 6.84 81.116 6.84 80.695 6.91 80.782 6.58
Percentage Black 13.038 6.46 13.144 6.52 12.399 6.08 12.946 6.49 13.368 6.34
Percentage Hispanic 10.975 10.77 10.848 10.42 11.74 12.68 10.899 10.61 11.251 11.35
Average Annual Income ($) 25488.15 3939.85 25573.86 3875.25 24973.87 4283.28 25491.51 3895.3 25476.06 4103.68
Population1 5551948 4683874 5526000 4632204 5707635 4994077 5481401 4631793 5805594 4867179
Year Dummies     
1992 0.221 0.42 0.232 0.42 0.157 0.36 0.236 0.42 0.168 0.37
1993 0.239 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.174 0.38 0.248 0.43 0.206 0.41
1997 0.264 0.44 0.258 0.44 0.302 0.46 0.256 0.44 0.294 0.46
1998 0.276 0.45 0.261 0.44 13.213 1.15 0.26 0.44 0.332 0.47
Sample Size 1203 1031 172 942 262 
Note: 1. Population denotes the greater metro area population. 
Source: All variables except Race and Greater Metro Area Characteristics (GMAC) extracted from the Lahman Baseball Database (Version 5.0, 
Release Date: Dec. 15, 2002). Race is derived form observed Topps Baseball Cards, years 92, 93, 94, 97, 99 (only years available). GMAC derived 
from the Statistical Abstract 1997-1999, the BEA, CA1-3, and from Statistical Canada.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Log Annual Salary – Hitters  
 (1) All (2) Native (3) Immigrant (4) White (5) Non-White 
(6) All  
Nativity* Productivity Interactions 
Variable Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat Mean Mean Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat 
Personal Characteristics     
Age -0.046 -4.12 -0.047 -3.86 -0.029 -0.99 -0.065 -4.30 -0.023 -1.36 -0.044 -3.94 - -
White 0.020 0.43 0.011 0.22 0.024 0.10 - - - - 0.014 0.31 - -
Non-White - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Native -0.051 -0.92 - - - - -0.124 -0.38 -0.05 -0.87 0.193 0.26 - -
Immigrant - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Professional Characteristics     
MLB Experience 0.317 7.24 0.330 6.89 0.279 2.75 0.356 6.06 0.294 5.47 0.276 3.00 0.051 0.50
MLB Experience-Squared -0.021 -10.40 -0.021 -9.57 -0.023 -4.58 -0.021 -7.68 -0.023 -10.05 -0.226 -4.66 0.001 0.25
Tenure with Current Club 0.043 6.55 0.041 5.71 0.098 5.47 0.034 3.83 0.049 4.97 0.095 5.54 -0.054 -2.94
Free Agent 0.632 4.41 0.555 3.52 0.801 2.43 0.451 2.25 0.741 4.18 0.868 2.77 -0.309 -0.88
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration 0.366 4.49 0.322 3.60 0.438 2.11 0.335 2.86 0.377 3.72 0.500 2.69 0.207 0.40
American League -0.063 -1.65 -0.065 -1.53 -0.128 -1.34 -0.128 -2.38 -0.029 -0.51 -0.125 -1.43 0.058 0.59
Canadian Team -0.070 -0.49 -0.216 -1.39 0.279 0.89 -0.238 -1.21 0.062 0.31 0.173 0.94 -0.344 -2.17
Performance     
At Bats 0.000 2.55 0.000 2.39 0.000 0.77 0.000 1.05 0.000 2.50 0.000 0.88 0.000 0.17
Stolen Bases 0.001 3.73 0.001 3.85 0.000 0.32 0.001 2.18 0.001 3.11 0.000 0.02 0.001 1.06
Bases on Balls 0.000 0.76 0.000 0.07 0.001 2.60 0.000 -0.08 0.000 2.12 0.001 2.77 -0.001  -2.53
Total Bases 0.000 1.42 0.000 1.10 0.000 1.11 0.000 1.34 0.000 0.86 0.000 1.18 -0.000 -0.58
Slugging Average 4.240 7.45 4.610 7.47 1.026 0.74 4.386 5.11 3.885 5.46 1.100 0.86 3.518 2.53
Batting Average 3.425 3.21 2.714 2.33 7.949 2.78 0.913 0.63 6.002 3.92 7.572 2.86 -4.874 -1.70
Infielder 0.026 0.14 0.011 0.05 -0.073 -0.20 -0.252 -0.83 0.066 0.30 -0.053 -0.15 0.063 0.15
Outfielder -0.108 -0.59 -0.163 -0.75 0.01 0.03 -0.383 -1.25 -0.085 -0.38 0.027 0.08 -0.191 -0.49
Catcher 0.304 1.56 0.249 1.11 0.384 0.98 -0.02 -0.06 0.495 2.02 0.414 1.13 -0.167 -0.39
Designated Hitter 0.046 0.31 0.093 0.50 -0.15 -0.65 -0.196 -0.70 0.155 0.96 -0.163 -0.68 0.254 0.85
Greater Metro Area Characteristics     
Percentage White 0.004 0.84 0.001 0.16 0.011 0.92 0.002 0.21 0.003 0.48 0.003 0.71 - -
Percentage Black 0.008 1.57 0.005 0.84 0.014 1.17 0.008 1.13 0.008 1.01 0.007 1.43 - -
Percentage Hispanic 0.002 0.96 0.003 1.06 -0.003 -0.46 0.005 1.60 -0.001 -0.39 0.002 0.90 - -
Average Annual Income ($) 0.000 0.87 0.000 0.45 0.000 0.44 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.94 0.000 0.77 - -
Population1 0.000 -0.32 0.000 -0.35 0.000 0.51 0.000 -0.35 0.000 -0.03 0.000 -0.23 - -
Year Dummies     
1992 0.069 1.31 0.067 1.15 0.139 1.12 0.048 0.61 0.091 1.26 0.075 3.14 - -
1993 0.129 1.92 0.144 1.90 0.162 1.13 0.19 2.08 0.055 0.57 0.142 2.15 - -
1997 0.208 2.83 0.240 2.84 0.241 1.50 0.215 2.23 0.176 1.64 0.230 3.14 - -
Constant 9.515 12.96 10.001 11.75 8.283 5.46 11.249 9.68 8.344 8.46 9.418 10.37 - -
R-Squared 0.7385 0.7280 0..8243 0.7266 0.7686 0.7465 
F-Statisitc 184.62 28, 1064 150.05 27, 873 53.24 27, 164 94.28 27, 521 102.36 27, 516 125.26 45, 1047 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.58452 0.5870 0.54901 0.58971 0.57091 0.58016 
Observations 1093 901 192 549 544 1093 
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Table 4: Log Annual Salary – Pitchers  
 (1) All (2) Native (3) Immigrant (4) White (5) Non-White 
(6) All  
Nativity* Productivity Interactions 
Variable Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat Mean Mean Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat Mean T-Stat 
Personal Characteristics     
Age -0.002 -0.22 -0.013 -1.24 0.043 2.06 -0.017 -1.67 0.054 2.90 -0.002 -0.21 - -
White 0.058 1.15 0.108 1.90 -0.197 -1.83 - - - - 0.052 1.00 - -
Non-White - - - - - - - - - -  - -
Native -0.103 -1.69 - - - - 0.067 0.78 -0.194 -2.50 0.531 1.04 - -
Immigrant     
Professional Characteristics     
MLB Experience 0.153 4.46 0.162 4.57 0.252 2.83 0.179 5.14 0.157 2.00 0.223 3.03 -0.077 -0.95
MLB Experience-Squared -0.014 -9.37 -0.014 -9.08 -0.026 -7.03 -0.014 -9.13 -0.021 -6.52 -0.024 -8.51 0.010 3.15
Tenure with Current Club 0.068 7.46 0.068 7.08 0.016 0.59 0.064 6.44 0.064 3.08 0.020 0.89 0.048 1.94
Free Agent 0.739 6.05 0.800 6.17 -0.022 -0.08 0.761 5.83 0.418 1.51 0.127 0.50 0.681 2.38
Eligible for Final Offer Arbitration 0.421 6.37 0.470 6.73 -0.005 -0.03 0.47 6.53 0.143 1.06 0.013 0.09 0.464 2.86
American League -0.009 -0.26 -0.019 -0.49 0.095 0.94 -0.028 -0.70 -0.015 -0.18 0.097 1.15 -0.118 -1.33
Canadian Team -0.026 -0.21 0.036 0.25 0.160 0.67 -0.01 -0.07 0.208 0.82 0.060 0.39 -0.035 -0.27
Performance     
Starter 0.383 7.65 0.37 7.10 0.360 2.37 0.382 6.87 0.41 3.95 0.304 1.91 0.075 0.45
Wins 0.009 2.10 0.007 1.63 0.049 3.70 0.006 1.33 0.04 3.89 0.045 3.53 -0.038   -2.84
Losses 0.004 1.09 0.005 1.09 -0.009 -0.99 0.004 0.82 0.01 1.13 -0.019 -2.18 0.024 2.53
Games Started -0.003 -2.38 -0.002 -1.54 -0.011 -2.44 -0.001 -0.76 -0.012 -4.37 -0.013 -2.40 0.011 1.96
Complete Games 0.001 0.38 0.002 0.71 -0.005 -0.35 0.001 0.48 -0.02 -1.80 -0.011 -0.93 0.014 1.15
Shutouts -0.048 -4.41 -0.054 -4.52 -0.030 -0.84 -0.057 -4.65 0.003 0.09 -0.020 -0.58 -0.034 -0.92
Saves 0.003 3.50 0.002 3.33 0.005 1.98 0.003 4.15 0.001 0.33 0.005 2.39 -0.003 -1.17
Homeruns -0.005 -3.71 -0.005 -3.74 -0.008 -1.46 -0.006 -3.80 -0.004 -0.89 -0.003 -0.07 -0.002 -0.48
Walks 0.000 -0.95 0.000 -1.23 0.000 0.08 -0.001 -1.54 0.000 0.23 0.000 0.13 -0.001       -0.49
Strikeouts 0.001 1.85 0.001 2.11 0.001 0.88 0.001 2.97 -0.002 -2.39 0.001 1.00 -0.000 -0.08
Innings Pitched 0.001 2.43 0.001 2.15 0.002 1.18 0.001 1.84 0.002 1.90 0.002 1.79 -0.001 -0.74
ERA -0.131 -5.32 -0.138 -5.57 -0.025 -0.33 -0.150 -6.36 -0.025 -0.49 0.015 0.23 -0.160 -2.29
Strikeout Rate 5.590 4.15 5.682 4.28 0.498 0.17 5.588 4.14 7.846 2.86 4.054 1.33 1.415   0.44
Greater Metro Area Characteristics     
Percentage White 0.001 0.27 0.002 0.41 0.002 0.18 0.002 0.36 -0.001 -0.06 0.002 0.37 - -
Percentage Black 0.005 0.97 0.006 1.16 0.008 0.70 0.005 0.96 0.008 0.74 0.006 1.20 - -
Percentage Hispanic 0.005 2.66 0.005 2.52 0.005 1.00 0.005 2.31 0.008 1.69 0.005 2.51 - -
Average Annual Income ($) 0.000 0.76 0.000 1.09 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.47 0.000 0.84 0.000 1.07 - -
Population1 0.000 0.49 0.000 -0.42 0.000 0.91 0.000 0.90 0.000 -0.52 0.000 0.09 - -
Year Dummies     - -
1992 0.012 0.25 0.045 0.89 -0.251 -1.80 0.041 0.77 -0.099 -1.04 0.021 0.43 - -
1993 0.126 2.10 0.098 1.50 0.19 1.30 0.127 1.90 0.021 0.15 0.116 1.94 - -
1997 0.250 3.68 0.184 2.46 0.437 2.72 0.209 2.74 0.215 1.43 0.228 3.38 - -
Constant 11.275 17.67 11.253 16.1 9.817 6.74 11.57 16.08 9.171 6.44 10.60 12.80 - -
R-Squared 0.7848 0.7933 0.8396 0.7976 0.8092 0.796 
F-Statisitc 195.83 31, 1171 190.83 30, 1000 47.05 30, 141 186.13 30, 910 55.38 30, 231 138.80 51, 1151 
Root Mean Squared Error 0.56049 0.55222 0.50688 0.54665 0.54352 0.55039 
Observations 1203 1031 172 941 262 1203 
 
Table 5: Oaxaca-Cotton Decompositions: Native Hitter / Immigrant Hitter  
 ∆ lnw
NH − IH = lnwNH − lnw IH  
 Coef. % 
   
Native Hitter Wage Structure   
Endowment Effect:  ΒˆNH ΧNH − Χ IH( ) 6.031 95.75 
Price Effect:  Χ IH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( ) 0.267 4.25 
Total Differential:  ΒˆNH ΧNH − Χ IH( )+ Χ IH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( ) 6.298 100.00 
   
Immigrant Hitter Wage Structure   
Endowment Effect:  ΒˆIH ΧNH − ΧIH( ) 7.183 114.05 
Price Effect:  ΧNH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( ) -0.885 -14.05 
Total Differential:  ΒˆIH ΧNH − Χ IH( )+ ΧNH ΒˆNH − ΒˆIH( ) 6.298 100.00 
   
Hybrid Wage Structure 
  
Native Hitter Overpayment:  ΧNH ΒˆNH − Β( ) 0.047 0.75 
Immigrant Hitter Underpayment:  Χ IH Β− ΒˆIH( ) -0.729 -11.58 
Endowment Effect:  Β ΧNH − Χ IH( ) 6.980 110.83 
Total Differential:  ΧNH ΒˆNH − Β( )+ Χ IH Β− ΒˆIH( )+ Β ΧNH − Χ IH( ) 6.298 100.00 
 
 
Table 6: Oaxaca-Cotton Decompositions: Native Pitcher / Immigrant Pitcher  
 ∆ lnw
IP = lnwNP − lnw IP  
 Coef. % 
   
Native Pitcher Wage Structure   
Endowment Effect:  ΒˆNP ΧNP − Χ IP( ) 0.397 -12527.91 
Price Effect:  Χ IP ΒˆNP − ΒˆIP( ) -0.400 12627.91 
Total Differential:  ΒˆNP ΧNP − Χ IP( )+ Χ IP ΒˆNP − ΒˆIP( ) -0.003 100.00 
   
Immigrant Pitcher Wage Structure   
Endowment Effect:  ΒˆIP ΧNP − ΧIH( ) 0.412 13108.88 
Price Effect:  ΧNP ΒˆNP − ΒˆIP( ) -0.415 -13008.88 
Total Differential:  ΒˆIP ΧNP − Χ IP( )+ ΧNP ΒˆNP − ΒˆIP( ) -0.003 100.00 
   
Hybrid Wage Structure 
  
Native Pitcher Overpayment:  ΧNP ΒˆNP − Β( ) -0.057 1679.40 
Immigrant Pitcher Underpayment:  Χ IP Β− ΒˆIP( ) -0.355 10399.52 
Endowment Effect:  Β ΧNP − ΧIP( ) 0.409 -11978.92 
Total Differential:  ΧNP ΒˆNP − Β( )+ Χ IP Β− ΒˆIP( )+ Β ΧNP − Χ IP( ) -0.003 100.00 
 
